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Abstract
Higher education (HE) administrators worldwide are responding to
performance-based state agendas for public institutions. Largely
ideologically-driven, this international fixation on performance is also
advanced by the operation of isomorphic forces within HE's institutional
field. Despite broad agreements on the validity of performance goals,
there is no "one best" model or predictable set of consequences. Context
matters. Responses are conditioned by each nation's historical and
cultural institutional legacy. To derive a generalized set of consequences,
issues, and impacts, we used a comparative international format to
examine the way performance models are applied in the United States,
England, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Our
theoretical framework draws on understandings of performance measures
as normalizing instruments of governmentality in the "evaluative state,"
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supplemented by field theory of organizations. Our conclusion supports
Gerard Delanty's contention, that universities need to redefine
accountability in a way that repositions them at the heart of their social
and civic communities.
 
I. Introduction
         In recent years, the imposition of performance models on institutions of higher
education has become a widespread practice. National systems are in place in France,
Britain, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand. In federations like
Germany, the US, and Canada, individual Länder, states, and provinces have taken the
initiative (Brennan, 1999; Woodhouse, 1996). 
         Performance models include, but are not limited to, social technologies like
performance indicators. They are situated within broader, ideological mechanisms
variously characterized as public sector reform, new public management (NPM), or what
Neave, in the context of higher education (HE), calls "the evaluative state" (Neave,
1998; 1988). These mechanisms attempt to impose accountability on public sector
institutions and improve service provision, by measuring performance against
managerial, corporate, and market criteria. 
        Accountability and service improvement are common goals of all HE performance
models. But different national systems adopt different combinations of supplementary
goals. These include stimulating internal and external institutional competition;
verifying the quality of new institutions; assigning institutional status; justifying
transfers of state authority to institutions; and facilitating international comparisons
(Brennan, 1999:223). The particular combination of goals depends on specific national
contexts, and the balance within them of accountability, markets, and trust (Brennan,
1999; Trow, 1998).
        But the foundations of these structural changes extend beyond ideological reform of
public-sector institutions. They are rooted, as well, in the post-war transition from élite
to mass systems of higher education (Scott, P. 1995). Arguably, the momentum of
massification alone would have enforced restructuring of the HE system in most
jurisdictions (Neave, 1998; Dill, 1998). The combination of HE expansion and the 
emergence of the evaluative state produces international convergence around the
implementation of performance models.
        Furthermore, convergence proceeds at a far-from-uniform rate. It is modulated by
path-dependent national institutions and entrenched cultural traditions, and the divergent
starting points of each national system. Broadly speaking, public universities in the
Anglo-Saxon countries are moving from a position of strong autonomy to one of
subordination to centralized, state control. For continental Europe and Scandinavia,
where strong state control was the norm, more control of higher education is being ceded
to the institutions. 
        These apparently contradictory trajectories converge at the level of institutional
performance and accountability (Henkel and Little, 1999) where, as Newson (1998:113)
has pointed out, "criteria such as 'efficiency,' 'productivity,' and 'accountability' are
becoming embedded in the routine day-to-day decision-making that takes place in 'local'
units throughout the university." At this level, the proliferation of a few dominant
models can be explained, in part, by the operation of isomorphic forces within
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institutional fields, whereby "lead" organizations set the pace for "followers" (Powell &
DiMaggio, 1983.) 
        Performance models have now been in place long enough for studies of
consequences to be undertaken (Neave, 1998; Dill 1998). For example, a recent
15-country OECD study, under the direction of John Brennan and Tarla Shah of Britain's
Open University, considers the impact of performance models in 40 participating
institutions. On the basis of early analyses, Brennan (1999) reports that while impacts
are conditioned by the nature of the individual institution and the distribution of
authority in the HE system, performance mechanisms appear to have raised the profile of
teaching and learning in HE institutions. He finds that overall impact is increased when
the mechanisms gain legitimacy at the faculty and department level, and that increased
centralization and managerialism is characteristic at the level of the institution. In some
countries, Brennan suggests, evaluation and assessment mechanisms tilt the distribution
of power away from faculty and towards senior managers and administrators. But in
other countries, where the management layer is traditionally weak, the impacts of
external evaluations are more important. 
        A potential weakness of this otherwise exhaustive study is its reliance on
institutional self-reports. By surveying a wide range of methodologically diverse studies
from different national contexts, we hope to distill a robust set of findings. We first
construct the theoretical framework of the "evaluative state," through which to view the
policy and administrative implications of performance models. We then consider the
theoretical importance of accounting tools in performance measurement, before defining
the terms and trends in performance-based HE management. Next, utilizing a
comparative international format, we summarize the impact of HE performance models
in the United States, England, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and the Netherlands.
Where appropriate, we add the results of cross-national studies. Finally, we attempt to
synthesize our findings into a generalized set of consequences, identifying system-level
effects, technical performance issues, institutional effects and management issues,
impacts on teaching and research, and on faculty and academic departments. 
 
II. The Evaluative State
        Fundamental changes in the policies and practices of most OECD countries have
followed a cultural shift in the public management paradigm over the last two decades.
Public sector reforms induced fundamental changes, not only in policies and practices,
but also in the culture underlying the public administration of nation-states (Strange,
1996; Aucoin, 1995; Charih and Daniels, 1997; OECD, 1995; Keating 1998). This new
culture took as axiomatic market-like principles of cost-recovery, competitiveness, and
entrepreneurship in the provision of public services (Power 1996; Charih and Rouillard,
1997). Criteria of economy and efficiency were supported by “broad accusations of
waste, inefficiency, excessive staffing, unreasonable compensations, freeloading, and so
forth” (Harris 1998:137). "Rational" corporate management techniques were installed
incorporating accounting, auditing, accountability, and performance criteria. The intent
was not only to make public institutions less costly and more effective, but also to
normalize and entrench private sector principles (Hood, 1991, 1995; Savoie, 1995;
Harris, 1998). The application of these criteria to HE produced elaborate exercises in
"visioning," "re-engineering," and "quality assurance," structured on the basis of
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transparent and auditable accountability for performance (Power, 1996). 
        International convergence around these ideals renders the putative retreat of the
state somewhat illusory (Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996; Strange, 1996; Dale, 1997).
Rather than regulating directly, however, the state now regulates from a distance,
assuring accountability through refined forms of "remote control" or steering (Burchell
et al., 1991; Barry et al., 1996; Power, 1995). Neave neatly points to the paradox: “what
some regard as a lighter form of surveillance…goes hand in hand with a veritable orgy
of procedures, audits, [and] instruments of administrative intelligence which, in their
scope and number…make those which upheld the state-control model appear rustic”
(1998:266). By using these mechanisms to steer from a distance, the state ensures its
performance agenda is internalized by the institution. Thus regulation becomes
self-regulation, and state control becomes self-control—a type of self-disciplining
Foucault (1978) called "governmentality." 
        In his study of Continental European HE systems, Maassen (1997) empirically
identified this move. In the countries Maassen studied, detailed regulation of the inputs
and processes of HE is no longer practiced. Instead, institutions themselves create the
conditions for achieving the outcomes required by the state, thereby demonstrating the
effects of “remote steering” (Maassen 1997:125). To induce self-regulation and
self-surveillance in institutions, Maassen found that European governments are also
abandoning existing rigid legal frameworks—a move Neave (1998) calls
"dejuridification"—in favour of "framework laws." Maassen suggests that European HE
is undergoing the most far-reaching transition since that from élite to mass systems.
What we are seeing, he speculates, might be “only the beginning of a long-term trend
that will change HE far more fundamentally than we can imagine” (1997:125).
        According to Neave, the beginning of this long-term trend was the emergence of
the evaluative state “from two very different discourses, the one European and political,
the other mainly American and economic” (1998:278). In the first discourse, control of
universities mirrored broader democratic issues, while the second was a direct bid to
substitute market control for state control. The former tended to predominate in France,
Sweden, Belgium, and Spain, according to Neave, while the latter dominated in the UK
and the Netherlands and rooted itself earlier. Both discourses converged, Neave says,
around three major displacements in HE. 
        One displacement is increasing concentration on strategic planning and systems
development. Another marks the emergence of powerful, intermediary "buffer bodies" to
serve as the state's agents in evaluation and surveillance. The third is the proliferation of
increasingly demanding performance models, including quality assessment and
assurance; continuous improvement; performance-based funding, budgeting, and
management; strategic planning and budgeting; and total quality management. In one
way or another, all these models rely on measurements or "indicators" of performance. 
 
III. Issues in Measuring Performance
        Paradoxically, the evaluative state's self-regulating "governmentality" requires
fidelity devices to measure and induce compliance. Largely, these calculative practices
(Miller, 1994) or rituals of verification (Power, 1995) employ accounting tools, such as
budgets, cost/benefit analyses, cost-centre comparisons, financial audits, and an
increasing array of performance and compliance audits (Power, 1995; Porter, 1995;
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Harris, 1998). Accounting tools enable “actions on the actions of others…to remedy
deficits of rationality and responsibility” (Miller: 1994:29). They are characterized by
their surveillance and control capacities, i.e. ability to determine norms, then discipline
performance against them (Hoskin and Macve, 1993). 
        Despite appearances, accounting techniques and numbers are not neutral reflections
of "reality." Rather, they selectively construct reality from complex webs of social and
economic negotiations. An accounting "fact" is actually a contingent and partial
accomplishment. Yet contingency and partiality disappear in inscription. Tabulated,
calculated, and double-underlined, accounting "facts" appear incontrovertible—the very
essence of stability, objectivity, and impartiality. 
        In a university setting, the apparent objectivity of such "facts" can undermine
autonomy, “open[ing] up the routine evaluation of academic activities to other than
academic considerations, and…mak[ing] it possible to replace substantive judgements
with formulaic and algorithmic representation” (Polster and Newson 1998:175). A
financial calculus thus underpins the discourse of performance in HE, and constitutes its
instrumental logic. The instrumentalities include performance indicators, quality indices,
and benchmarking standards. In a detailed study of institutions in three commonwealth
countries, Miller (1995:1) found that these market-based, managerial instrumentalities
“have modified or come to dominate the governance and culture of universities in
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada”. Commenting on the lack of faculty
resistance, Miller argues that as academics become constrained, monitored, and
documented by performance criteria, they come to collude in the construction of their
own fate (cf Harley and Lowe 1999).
        Performance indicators (PIs) are the key instrumentality. Watts (1992) studied the
major OECD countries, looking at accountability and performance measures. Of the
eight commonalities he found, PIs were by far the most significant. PIs replace
traditional input measures, like the number of students enrolled, with goal- or result-
oriented estimates of outcomes or value-added, such as the quality and employability of
graduates. Identifying one of their most contentious aspects, Watts (1992:87) comments
that “many of these efforts have found...real problems in trying to measure quantitatively
the unmeasurable.”
        Harris (1998:136) reminds us that despite their objectified and factual appearance,
much of the accounting and other data used to construct PIs derives from the subjective
exercise of judgement. Similar judgements are also exercised on the indicators
themselves, which are interpreted to infer "facts" that then “create the domain of the
factual” (Harris, 1998: 136). Because PIs focus on readily quantifiable inputs and
outputs, they tend to neglect the more complex social variables that resist measurement
(Newson, 1992; Harris, 1998). And, because of the difficulty of linking measurable
outputs to inputs and processes, there is a danger is that “targeted goals, as reflected in
indicators, often become ends rather than means” (Harris, 1998:136).
        El-Khawas and colleagues note that “academics have resisted the move towards
performance indicators, arguing that [they] are reductionist, offer inaccurate
comparisons, and are unduly burdensome” (1998:9). As a result, she notes, some
governments are introducing PIs incrementally, requiring universities to generate an
increasing amount of quantitative data for intermediary bodies. Others have embedded
PIs in institutional contracts or other forms of conditional funding. While debate
continues on their appropriate use, she says, in most countries public officials advocate
the development of a few relevant performance indicators, together with comparisons
among institutions and over time. She differentiates England, which “took a further step
by linking the amount of research funding to performance scores of academic
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departments” (El-Khawas et al., 1998:9). In the studies cited later, we will find more
variation than El-Khawas suggests in the numbers and types of indicators tracked. We
will also see that the pattern of linking funding to performance extends beyond research
to HE budgets more generally. And we will find performance-linked funding in, for
example, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand as well as in England.
        While there is no single, agreed-upon definition of PIs, the one developed by Cave,
Hanney, and Kogan (1991:24) is still applicable:
a performance indicator is an authoritative measure—usually in quantitative
form—of an attribute of the activity of a higher education institution. The
measure may be ordinal or cardinal, absolute or comparative. It thus
includes both the mechanical applications of formulae (where the latter are
imbued with value or interpretative judgements) and such informal and
subjective procedures as peer evaluation or reputational rankings.
        One of the principal causes of controversy surrounding the use of PIs is their link to
performance-related funding and budgeting. It is important to differentiate between these
terms. According to Burke and Serban (1998:2), “the advantages and disadvantages of
each are the reverse of the other. In performance funding, the tie between results and
resources is clear but inflexible. In performance budgeting, the link is flexible but
unclear.” Performance funding ties separate and usually small allocations of funding
directly to institutional performance against a normally limited number of indicators. In
performance budgeting, a longer list of indicators provides an overall picture of
institutional performance; this then supplies the context in which a decision on the
institution's total budget allocation is made. The former enhances the incentive to
improve performance, but punishes circumstances beyond institutional control. Further,
the small sums allocated are disproportionate to the effort required to generate the data.
The flexibility of the latter allows for extenuating circumstances, but diminishes specific
incentives to improve (Burke and Serban, 1998.) 
        Johnstone (1998) confirms these differences, and notes that both are rooted in
conceptions of administrators as "rational actors" who will maximize whatever is
rewarded. According to Johnstone, conventional budget drivers—particularly full-time
equivalent enrollments—induce institutions to "over-enroll" at the cost of quality and
can lead to a concentration on popular programs that can be taught cheaply (1998:16). In
contrast, performance-based budgets use criteria such as degrees awarded, time to
completion, graduates' external performance, faculty success in attracting competitive
research grants, and faculty reputations with peers. However, says Johnstone, proponents
of performance criteria are beginning to realize that there is a need to balance “multiple,
difficult-to-measure, and not always compatible goals” (Johnstone, 1998:16). For
example, to maximize student accessibility, institutions are encouraged to accept
promising but less-qualified students. This goal is incompatible with maximizing
completion rates or postgraduate examination performance. 
        The offsetting advantages and disadvantages of performance funding and
performance budgeting helps to explain why increasing numbers of states in the U.S.A.
are adopting both systems (Burke and Serban, 1998). While examples of performance
models could be found in some states (e.g. Tennessee) as early as the 1970s, by 1998
they were utilized in half the states in the U.S.A. Reported intentions predict that 70% of
states will have adopted performance funding or budgeting models by 2002 (Burke and
Serban, 1998). 
        There is more than rational judgement at work here; a "bandwagon" is rolling.
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Organizational theory assists our understanding of this phenomenon. Powell and
Dimaggio (1983), for example, have pointed to the role of isomorphic forces in
stabilizing institutional and organizational fields around a dominant model. The forces at
work may be regulative, normative, cognitive, or any combination thereof, depending on
the nature of the field (Scott, R. 1995). Thus the particular combinations of state policy,
programs, and funding (regulative); academic values and norms of accountability
(normative); and the way the social purpose of HE is framed (cognitive) might be
expected to produce fairly similar institutional responses to performance criteria that
may, nevertheless, differ in important respects in different national and sub-national
contexts.
        Further, formal organizations like universities and colleges tend to adopt prevailing
"rituals of rationality" to increase their legitimacy and chances for survival (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977; Kaghan, 1998). These rituals of rationality increasingly include principles
of profitability and "good management" derived from the private sector. Public
universities and colleges, therefore, can be situated in a larger institutional framework
where the system of organizations is isomorphically aligned around ideological
commitments to private sector principles of rationality. 
        But as Kaghan (1998:172) points out, institutional theories tend to focus at the
macrostructural level and pay little attention the "microdynamics" of specific practices.
To attend to this level of detail, we now consider the way performance models are
enacted in different national contexts. A comprehensive examination of US and UK
experiences is followed by less detailed analyses of Australia, New Zealand, Sweden
and the Netherlands. 
 
IV. Performance Models in Context
1.State Models in the United States 
        Policy-makers in the U.S.A. were among the first to experiment with monitoring
the performance of publicly funded institutions of higher education. In the 1960s and
1970s, state officials began examining possibilities of allocating resources to institutions
according to how well they achieved state objectives and outcomes (Layzell, 1998). 
        Tennessee was the first state to implement performance funding in higher
education. Well regarded in the US, the program is considered a success. The Tennessee
State Higher Education Board initiated a pilot program in 1975. By 1979, state officials,
working with advisory groups, had developed a set of ten performance criteria. These,
and the associated measurement and reporting procedures, were applied to all public
universities and colleges (El-Khawas, 1998). During 1980-81, public institutions were
able to earn up to 2 percent above formula allocations, based on performance against
these criteria (Albright, 1997). The plan has been reviewed and updated at five-year
intervals since then. Today, the amount of discretionary funding available to reward
good performance stands at 5.5 percent of an institution's overall budget. Explicit goals
are targeted over an extended period of time, allowing institutional behaviour to be
shaped towards desired ends.
        Because of isomorphic forces, the success of the Tennessee program led to the
development of similar programs in Arkansas, Missouri and Ohio (El-Khawas, 1998).
But conformity is far from total. Texas is among several states that have studied,
proposed, and rejected performance funding—largely because of a lack of support from
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state legislators, combined with cumbersome reporting requirements, and reduced
institutional autonomy (Albright 1997). On the other hand, the State of South Carolina
has adopted measures that ties allocation of the state's entire budget for public higher 
education to institutional performance against 37 specific indicators (Burke and Serban,
1998) .
        One notable characteristic of Tennessee-style performance funding is that it is
non-competitive. All institutions can access these supplemental "bonus" funds. If one
fails to obtain its share of the supplementary funds, the others do not benefit. Generally,
however, policy-makers today are less favourably inclined to voluntary institutional
improvement; systems of mandated public accountability are becoming the norm. As
with the introduction of the Tennessee model, we see a tendency to copy other states'
systems, in an attempt to develop a common core of indicators to address common
problems. 
        A study by the National Association of State Budget Offices (NASBO, 1996)
reviews measures adopted by 38 states in addressing calls for HE improvement and
accountability. These include budget reforms, restructuring of governance,
performance-based funding, and privatization of teaching hospitals. We cannot report on
this study in detail, or present the responses of all the participating states. However,
certain states can be considered "indicators" of the changes induced by performance
models in all states.
        Arizona's Budget Reform Act of 1993 resulted in the development of a master list
of state government programs in 1995, complete with mission statements of institutions,
functional program descriptions, goals, performance measures, funding and staff
information. This was the first opportunity for state analysts to determine budgets and
funding sources for higher education. Subsequently, in an attempt to increase graduation
rates without increasing the budget, a "short" Bachelor's Degree program (three-years)
was implemented at Northern Arizona University. As well, certain programs
implemented a twelve-month academic year. Faculty could elect to take their break in
either fall or spring instead of summer. To ensure a steady supply of enrollees, the
Arizona Legislature introduced a bill to provide HE scholarships to students who
graduated high school in three consecutive academic years and retained a GPA of at
least 3.0 (out of 4.0). State funding would be shifted from the K-12 system to the HE
system to fund the new measures. 
        In 1995, Arkansas moved from an enrollments-based funding policy to one focused
on productivity outcomes. The Institutional Productivity Committee and the State Board
of Education developed sixteen performance measures. Amendments to the Revenue
Stabilization Law resulted in the creation of a Higher Education Institutions Productivity
Fund, authorized to provide an additional $5 million and $10 million in fiscal years 1996
and 1997 respectively, on the basis of institutional performance on these measures.
        Also in 1995, the Governor of California agreed to provide lump-sum funding to
the University of California, and California State University for a period of three years
for general support, capital outlays, and to service debt requirements. In exchange, the
universities were required to increase enrollments and the portability of courses between
institutions; implement new productivity and efficiency increases each year; improve
student graduation times; and restore faculty salaries to competitive levels. Meanwhile,
in the Kansas fiscal 1997 budget, and the Kentucky 1994-1996 Appropriations Bill,
appropriation increases to higher education were based on performance funding concepts
and principles.
        On July 1, 1995, Minnesota merged three of the state's public, post-secondary
systems under a single governance structure. For 1995 and 1996, a portion of state
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appropriations to the University of Minnesota and the state's colleges and universities
was made contingent upon achievement of performance goals. For example, for the
University of Minnesota, $5 million of the 1996 appropriation was placed in a
performance incentive account, to be released in $1 million increments for achieving
each of five performance measures. The measures related to: a) recruitment and
retention of freshman students with high academic averages in 1995; b) increase in the
intake of minority students in 1996; c) increase in the number of women and minority
faculty hired in 1995-96; d) increase in graduation rates between 1994 and 1996; and e)
increase in the number of credits offered through telecommunications between 1995 and
1996. 
        Missouri adopted policies that ensure the recognition of institutional performance
through appropriate incentive funding. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, funding was
appropriated to reward institutions based on their attainment of certain goals: a)
assessment of graduates; b) graduation of minority students; c) number of students
pursuing graduate education; d) teacher-education graduates scoring in the upper half of
national exams; and e) job placement rates in major field. In fiscal year 1996, more that
$7 million of the ongoing untargeted funding for four- year institutions was distributed
according to these performance goals.
        While other states, including New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have all
undergone budget reform, restructuring, and the implementation of performance
measures, none has gone to the extreme of South Carolina. In 1996, at the urging of a
group of prominent business leaders, the State Commission for Higher Education
implemented the most significant performance-based funding program to date. The
program was phased-in. By the 2000 fiscal year, as stated earlier, 100% of state HE
funding will be allocated on the basis of institutional performance on 37 specific
indicators. This high number of indicators, as well as the total linking of funding to
performance, runs counter to conventional wisdom on performance models.
Agendas beyond Performance 
        The above review of performance models makes evident the extent to which they
can be used to advance state agendas other than those strictly concerned with
accountability and performance. In the case of Minnesota and Missouri, for example,
performance models are used to address state requirements for equity and equality in
public institutions. Thus the state can use these models to force HE institutions to
advance compliance with long-range state objectives. If the institutions successfully
comply, they are rewarded. Otherwise, there is an implicit threat that the state will step
in and take control of budgets and governance structures. But state policy is subject to
change with each election. In between, there may be insufficient time for political
objectives to be fully integrated into an institution's governance and funding structure.
        A recent study by the State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO, 1997),
provides a snapshot of the experience of 48 states in implementing performance
measures. The study indicates that: 
thirty-seven states used performance measures in some way 
this is more than double the number three years previously
twenty-six states plan to expand or refine current efforts
most states adopt performance measures for accountability purposes
twenty-three states use performance measures to inform consumers about higher
education
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twenty-three states use performance measures to distribute state funds to higher
education institutions (Network News, 1998:1-2).
       
Most of the performance models referred to in this study fail to differentiate between
longer-term state interests and short-term public demands. As well, in the twenty-three
states where performance measures supply information to consumers of HE, the
information reported is deemed more useful to policy-makers, than for assisting
individual consumers to make informed educational choices.
Responses to US Performance Models 
        The SHEEO and the NASBO studies cited above seem to indicate a shared
understanding between state officers and HE institutions about the importance of
performance models. This may not be the case. In a survey of higher education policy
issues (Ruppert, 1998), a total of 1008 respondents, consisting of political leaders
(n=519) and higher education leaders (n=489), from 12 Midwestern states were asked to
identify the most critical issues facing post-secondary education in the approach to the
21st century. Keeping higher education affordable was a major concern for both groups,
but political leaders ranked it as their first priority, while higher education leaders ranked
it second. Overall, how to pay for higher education (funding policies) was considered the
Midwest's second highest priority. For higher education leaders this was the number one
priority, while political leaders ranked it sixth out of nine issues. Capacity for change
was the third priority for higher education leaders while political leaders ranked this item
fifth. Not surprisingly, political leaders ranked ensuring accountability second, and
productivity and cost efficiency third priority, while higher education leaders ranked
these sixth and eighth respectively. With such disparities on the relative priorities of key
issues, will the two groups support one another? Or is the stage set for increased
tensions, in the form of either active or passive resistance to state mandated measures? 
        In analyzing responses to the SHEEO survey, Albright (1998) reports that in states
implementing performance-based funding, HE institutions accrue certain advantages.
They benefit from increased communication with, and support from political leaders; the
funding provides an alternative to enrollment-based subsidies, and acts as an incentive to
improve performance. By aligning planning goals with budgets, institutions can respond
to calls for accountability and reinforce confidence in higher education. However, the
design and implementation of a performance model is not accomplished without
difficulty. Ways must also be found to balance decreasing institutional autonomy and
increasing state review and control. Qualitative methods must be used to supplement
quantitative measures when studying institutional processes. There is a need to
overcome the complexities of measuring "quality," particularly as it pertains to student
learning, and to find measures that adequately reflect differences in institutional
missions. While some states have been more successful than others in introducing
performance measures, it is still too early to attempt to identify a single "best" US
model. 
        In terms of future prospects, a survey of state finance officers reports data on
legislative action plans for 1999 (McKeown-Moak, 1999). From the perspective of state
officials, the financial outlook for US higher education is better now than in years. State
appropriations reached the highest level ever in FY99, increasing four times faster than
the Consumer Price Index. HE's share of state general funds increased for the first time
in over a decade. Average tuition fees are rising steeply. State officials proclaim that
such positive economic conditions for higher education have not existed in the last two
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decades. 
        At the same time, administrators in HE institutions prepare for reduced
appropriations and increases in the use of performance models. Student debt loads
continue to rise at an alarming rate, and institutions that originally welcomed new
federal tax credits now face the added costs of compliance and record keeping. Added to
this, are increased competition for state resources; demands for up-to-date curricula that
keep pace with the economic and market change; approaching reelection campaigns for
state legislators; tensions with faculty and staff about internal restructuring to
accommodate performance criteria; and threats to restructure HE governance. Taken
together, these factors indicate the prospect of continuing struggle for US higher
education leaders. 
        A final note: Congress enacted changes to the Higher Education Act in October
1998. Beginning in the 2001 academic year, colleges and universities must submit
comprehensive reports on attendance costs for students, to the National Committee on
the Cost of Higher Education. NCHE will then publish trend information on tuition fees
and financial aid by institution, and compare this information with the Consumer Price
Index. Failure to comply will net the recalcitrant institution a fine of $25,000. Compared
to the burgeoning costs of reporting, some might consider the fine the more fiscally
prudent option for financially- starved institutions.
2. England 
        In England, performance models were first introduced in the early 1980s as an
ideological initiative of the Thatcher government. Continuing under Thatcher's
successor, John Major, they then, as in other countries, transcended the partisan divide
into Tony Blair's New Labour administration. 
        A number of intermediary agencies are responsible for administering the
performance agenda. These include the Higher Education Funding Councils of England
(HEFCE), Wales (HEFCW), and Scotland (SHEFC), which administer the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE), and the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC). Under
the recommendations of the Dearing Report, the latter was succeeded by the Quality
Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAAHE) in 1997. QAAHE administers
quality audits and the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA).
        The Research Assessment Exercises and Teaching Quality Assessments represent
longstanding programs of performance assessment. Both are controversial, for various
reasons. The purpose of the former is the highly selective distribution of funding in
support of high-quality research. It evaluates on the basis of perceived national and
international standards. The latter justifies public support on the basis of quality and
quality improvement, and rewards "excellence" in these areas. TQA evaluations are
mission-dependent. They inform rather than determine funding, and are less oriented to
quantitative data than the RAE, although both programs use performance indicators. 
        TQA indicators include student entry profiles; expenditures per student;
progression and completion rates; qualifications obtained; and subsequent destinations.
Institutions are assessed on six core aspects rated on a four-point scale. The RAE looks
for indicators relating to research publications; research grant income; numbers of
assistants and students employed; and the research environment. It rates seven categories
and relies on the subjective judgements of peer panels concerning the national and
international standing of the research departments assessed (Stanley and Patrick, 1998).
In contrast to this "arm's length" determination, TQAs involve site visits by external
assessors and encourage critical self-assessment of weaknesses as well as strengths.
Much of the criticism focused on the RAE stems from the statistical ranking of
12 of 35
institutional performance and the publication of those rankings in the media, with
subsequent reputational and funding effects. Criticism is also leveled at the underlying
methodology, the emphasis on outputs and the reliance on statistical data rather than
qualitative assessments, as well as the additional workload institutions face in complying
with performance models.
        The 1997 National Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education (Dearing, 1997)
made performance requirements even more explicit. Dearing recommended the
development of performance indicators and benchmarks for "families" of institutions
with similar characteristics, on the principle that the interpretation of performance
should take account of sector context and diversity. In response, the Higher Education
Funding Council (HEFCE) set up a Performance Indicators Study Group (PISG) to
develop indicators and benchmarks of performance, rather than descriptive statistics.
The latter, while they are “helpful in the management of institutions, can only be judged
in the light of the missions of institutions and do not purport to measure performance”
(PISG, 1999:8). In this regard, the group comments disparagingly on the publication of
"misleading and inaccurate" league tables. 
        In the first stage of its study, the group focused on producing indicators for the
government and funding councils that would also inform institutional management and
governance. Its immediate priority was the publication of institutional-level,
output-based indicators for research and teaching. Process indicators, such as the results
of TQAs, were rejected. By the time of its first report (PISG 1999), the group had
prepared proposals for indicators relating to: participation of under-represented groups;
student progression; learning outcomes and non-completion; efficiency of learning and
teaching; student employment; research output; and HE links with industry. All except
the latter related to both institutional and sector-levels. Responding to Dearing's
concerns about interpretive contexts, the group developed a set of "context statistics" for
each indicator to take account, for example, of an institution's student intake, its
particular subject mix, and the educational backgrounds of students. These will allow
“the results for any institution to be compared not with all institutions in the sector, but
with the average for similar institutions” (PISG, 1999:6). 
        The next stage of the study will look at the information needs of other stakeholders,
particularly students and their advisers. The third stage will respond to a call from the
Chancellor of the Exchequer to improve the indicators on student employment
outcomes. The PISG acknowledges that PIs in HE are “complicated and often
controversial” and that “the interpretation of indicators is generally at least as difficult as
their construction” (1999:12). They note that PIs require agreement about the values
(inputs) that make up the ratio, reliable data collection, and a consensus that a higher
ratio is "better" or "worse" than a lower ratio. The literature supports that none of these
is easily negotiable nor guaranteed in advance.
Faculty Responses to Performance Models in the UK 
        Among faculty and at the institutional level, responses to performance mechanisms
tend to follow a "strategy of accommodation" that focuses on technical rather than
normative aspects, and involves participation in the development of measures to make
them "more meaningful or less harmful" (Polster and Newson, 1998). Consequences of
this strategy in the UK include: the imposition of performance accounting systems for
rating faculty productivity; favouring of research that attracts funding; a competitive
transfer market in the CVs of "high performing" researchers; heavier and lighter teaching
loads for "less productive" and "more productive" researchers respectively; an associated
deterioration in teaching conditions; and a reordered system of state-appointed buffer
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bodies to allocate funding on the basis of externally determined criteria (Polster and
Newson, 1998: 177). These elements recur in the following detailed discussion of the
findings of two UK studies. Each examines the implications of performance models for
faculty in English universities
        Henkel (Henkel, 1997) studied seven disciplines across six different types of
universities, interviewing 105 adminstrators and academics at various levels in the
hierarchy. The study sought the implications of three performance policies: the research
assessment exercise (RAE); the Higher Education Quality Council's (HEQC) academic
audits for quality assurance; and the Higher Education Funding Council for England's
(HEFCE) teaching quality assessments (TQA). In five of the universities studied, Henkel
found a significant trend to "centralized decentralization"—strong central management
coupled with maximum devolution of responsibility. This involved the creation of
well-defined new roles at the centre, and the proliferation of non-academic support units.
In part, these were to mediate the state's performance expectations and policies, now
interpreted as corporate standards. Budgets were being devolved, usually to the
department level, and the iteration between the centre and departments was deemed
increasingly important. The new challenges were creating adaptation and status
problems for administrators in some universities. But in others, administrative roles
were expanding to meet the requirements of the new state policies. One administrator
referred to his new authority to “open the black box of academic decision making”
(Henkel, 1997:140).
        While those at the centre spoke of iteration, individual faculty and the basic units
were more aware of centralized authority. Many academics expressed "bitter resentment"
about the inordinate administrative requirements necessary to comply with performance
models, and strongly objected to the amount of time taken away from academic work
(141). Many expressed nostalgia for the élite system, and saw the new models as
attempting to compensate for the consequences of that system's disappearance. Thus,
performance models were viewed as connected with “an undervaluing of
individualization, excellence, and risk, espousing instead a "predictable mediocrity"”
(ibid). Some also saw the new models as facilitating instrumentalism and "satisficing"
behaviour on the part of students, as well linking with market values of consumerism
and customer-led education. At issue as well was the emergence of differentiated
contracts “based on competitiveness, insecurity, the casualization of academic
employment, and…the attenuation of institutional loyalty” (142).
        Henkel's findings are affirmed in a study of what Dominelli and Hoogvelt (1996)
describe as the "Taylorization" of academic labour. Taylorization is achieved through the
fragmentation, sequencing, and commodification of faculty work “into component parts
or activities, each part being translated or "operationalized" into empirically identifiable
and quantifiable indicators or measures” (79) These discrete "technical competencies"
may then be “subject to cost-efficiency scrutiny and put up for tender” (79). The
elimination of professional autonomy is another key aspect. Functional analysis defines
"competences," which are then further defined by performance criteria—the assessable
outcomes.
        What are the consequences of "Taylorization" and performance models for
academics? Dominelli & Hoogvelt describe increased workloads; shrinking resources;
dramatic declines in social status; and truncation of functions. They cite the following
statistics: 
between 1987 and 1993, student numbers in HE increased by 50% while academic
staff numbers increased by only 10%, and total spending per student fell by 50%.
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(p.82 and fns 35 and 36)
in the same period, core staff increased by 1.2% while staff employed on
temporary and short-term contracts increased 23% (p83)
in the OECD, between 1980 and 1990, the UK was the only country with real
negative growth in pay (-3.8%) for academic teachers (p83)
       
Echoing Henkel's findings, these writers suggest that the English performance model is
built on the following characteristics: (1) decentralized budget management; (2) peer
pressure and peer scrutiny of "performance"; and (3) flexible production techniques.
The UK's Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
        The RAE is a major and recurring evaluation of research performance. For a
comprehensive Foucauldian analysis of the RAE as a routine operation of surveillance
and assessment dependent on coercion and consent, see Broadhead and Howard (1998).
The last RAE was 1996; the next will be in 2001. The RAE directly affects the
allocation of funds from the higher education funding councils. Council research
budgets have not increased for some years so, for institutions, competition for research
funds is a zero-sum game with winners and losers. And, since the binary system of
universities and polytechnics was unified in 1992, this "flat" amount of funding now has
to be allocated to more than 40 institutions—twice the original number (McNay, 1999).
Reporting on the consequences of the 1992 and 1996 RAEs, McNay found that “money
was a great driver in participating in the RAE and the money that flows from it was the
main means by which it exercised influence for behaviour change” (1999:192).
        Institutional submissions to the RAE describe research performance and plans for
each academic area, and list by area all "research-active" staff, together with details of
their research output—publications, discoveries, patents, and so on. A series of panels
then judge performance—by a variety of different and not necessarily compatible
means—against approximately 70 criteria. The scale runs from 1 (research of little
consequence) through 5 (research of international renown), to 5* (outstanding)
(Williams, 1998). Funds to support research in a particular institution are subsequently
calculated from an aggregation of these determinations. Units that do well have funding
for the next five years, while poorly rated units try to limit the damage resulting from
lost income (ibid.).
        To discover the impacts of the RAE, McNay conducted 30 institutional case
studies; surveyed administrative and academic staff in 15 institutions; and interviewed
external stakeholders in the funding councils, industry, learned societies, and
professional bodies. Overall, he finds that the RAE's impacts extend beyond funding, to
affect “institutional strategies, priorities, and use of general resouces, not just those
flowing from RAE (1999:199). 
        He reports the following institutional-level impacts (1999:195-6). First, he found
more refinement of research policy and strategy, with research now focused in a smaller
number of priority areas. Next, the research function is better managed and more
efficient but administrative requirements have increased, with an increase in centralized
research management and the number of committees. Third, these changes are primarily
expressed through strategic policies and practices relating to research staffing. For
example, some universities adopted more exclusionary recruitment criteria favouring
"proven" researchers, and used the same exclusionary criteria to designate some existing
research staff "non-active." Contradicting other studies, McNay finds “some spending on
attracting "stars" [the CV transfer market] but this was marginal” (1999:196). 
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        Next, participation in the RAE caused an organizational restructuring that gradually
but effectively separated research from teaching. Research centres freed staff from
teaching responsibilities and graduate schools focused on research, leaving
undergraduate teaching responsibilities to the departments. Overall, 71% of unit heads
reported the RAE's positive impact on research, while 62% report its negative impact on
teaching. These results are hardly surprising since, as McNay states, “the Dearing
enquiry takes the breach [between teaching and research] as a fait accompli” (1999:198).
        Finally, and paradoxically, the RAE generated a virement (reallocation) of funds
from higher-graded to lower-graded departments. This reallocation was policy in several
of the institutions studied. Largely, the virement is a strategic response to an anomaly in
the RAE framework. RAE funding flows from "improvement." Top-rated departments
have no room for improvement on the RAE scale so receive no increase in funding. But
lower-rated areas can improve their performance and increase their funding. Therefore
“financially, improvers were better than star performers at the funding ceiling” (McNay,
1999:196). McNay also found internal reallocations of teaching funds to support
research activities.
        At the unit level, heads of research units were generally positive about the impact of
the RAE on productivity but expressed concerns about the related increase in stress.
Other concerns included: inhibition of new research areas and interdisciplinary research;
increasingly conservative approaches to research; and the aforementioned rupture
between teaching and research. Two other issues were important at the unit level. First,
concern was expressed at the rewarding of publication rather than dissemination. It was
felt that the RAE focused too exclusively on prestige journals “mainly read by other
academics, including panel members making RAE judgements”, whereas dissemination
could often be more effectively achieved through professional and popular journals read
by end-users (1999:198). McNay points out that there is a risk of “the academic
world…talking only to itself and so sterilising its work” (201). Second, staff
management was a major issue for unit heads—both the determination of researcher
status (active or inactive), and the reorganization of individual researchers into teams.
        At the individual researchers' level, only 34% in McNay's study believed the RAE
had improved the quality of their research. Most said the exercise had had little or no
impact on them, apart from the stress and time-loss associated with the administration of
performance exercises. Nevertheless, half now worked more in teams and about a third
reported some constraint on choice of research topics. About 58% believed that the
research agenda and priorities were defined by people other than researchers, “despite
the peer-review process of RAE and the prominence of academics in committees of the
research councils and other funding bodies” (199).
        Williams (1998:1079), a medical researcher involved in leading the RAE exercise
for his research group, takes a more combative stance. He believes the RAE uses
“restrictive, flawed, and unscientific criteria” and produces “a distorted picture of
research activity that can threaten the survival of active and productive research units”.
He says the exercise is “unaccountable, time-consuming, and expensive” and should be
made more objective. Williams identifies a number of major flaws in the RAE:
restrictive survey criteria; dubious performance indicators; loopholes and abuses;
inefficiencies and unnecessary expense; subjective unaccountable panel reviews; bias
towards established groups; and damage to other aspects of scholarship like teaching.
        McNay finally considers a number of system level impacts of the RAE. Through
what Williams (1998:1079) calls “the double blessing of money and prestige”, and the
RAE's competitive nature, the state seems to have succeeded in increasing research
achievements in exchange for little if any growth in the overall research budget.
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However, the costs are no less real. 
        McNay believes the research/teaching split was at least anticipated and probably
intended. Each was funded and assessed separately and held separately accountable.
Staff could be designated "teaching only" as well as "research only. And, increasingly,
research and teaching were organized in different forms. McNay notes that in the 1996
RAE, the education panel was the only one that would accept teaching material as
evidence of research output, and that “the teaching curriculum is being affected as senior
staff in universities withdraw support from [departments] with low RAE grades, so that
taught courses close” (200). Increasingly, staff rewards are research driven and some
teaching funds are being reallocated ("raided") to finance research. Yet, as McNay points
out, 80% of HE funding is for teaching. He questions the privileging of the "scholarship
of discovery" over the "scholarship of transmission."
        Another empirically based study investigated the RAE's impact on academic work
in two social science and two business disciplines (Harley and Lowe 1999). In the study,
some 80% of respondents identified changes and recruitment patterns in their discipline
generally. Of these, three- quarters attributed the changes directly to the RAE and a
further 18% held the RAE partly responsible. A quarter of the sample characterized the
changes in terms of less emphasis on teaching skills; just under two-thirds in terms of
greater emphasis on research; and just over two-thirds in terms of greater emphasis on 
publication. More than three-quarters of the sample cited changes in recruitment and
selection policies in their own departments as a result of the RAE. Asked about the
changes taking place in their disciplines, 52% characterized them as "bad," 18% as
"good and bad," and 23% as "good." In terms of impacts on their own work, 53% said
the RAE had influenced it and only 10% indicated no influence whatsoever.
3. Australia 
        In Australia, the country's 40 public research universities and two private
institutions are subject to a common framework of funding and regulation, that provides
some 60% of their total funding and subjects them to the performance requirements of
the Higher Education Funding Act (Marginson, 1998). Reform commenced in 1988,
with the abolition of the binary divide between universities and colleges of advanced
education, and has continued since that time. Reform included a number of early
initiatives: a system of discipline reviews conducted by panels of experts reporting to the
minister; the development and testing of a system of performance indicators; allocation
of special funds to support performance initiatives; and establishment of a fund to
improve teaching (Harman, 1998). There was strong emphasis on managerial modes of
operation, adequate levels of accountability, and maximum flexibility in
decision-making (Meek and Wood, 1998). Resulting changes have proved so extensive,
the process is often referred to as the "Australian Experiment." 
        During 1993-95, a number of innovative performance features were introduced
under the rubric of an annual academic audit focused on processes and outcomes
(Harman, 1998). Participating universities would conduct a self-evaluation and prepare a
detailed portfolio. Peer-review panels would visit and assess the institution's
effectiveness in performance outcomes and processes. Universities would be ranked on
the basis of effectiveness and outcome excellence and the rankings, together with
detailed reports, would be published annually. As in England's RAE, these rankings and
their publication were by far the most controversial element of the scheme. Results were
widely reported in the media. High-ranked universities found their prestige had
increased, while those who performed poorly experienced reputational damage. Finally,
the process would be driven by the incentive of incremental performance funding,
allocated according to the rankings, to a maximum of 5% of annual budgets for the
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top-ranked institutions (Harman, 1998). 
        Institutions have welcomed the additional funding and the program has garnered
the support of institutional leadership and others who saw a need for management
reforms and a greater client focus. Criticism has been severe however, much focused, as
in England, around the contentious ranking system which favours the older,
more-established universities; the underlying methodology and the reliance on narrow
statistical data; the additional workload; and the negative effects on less-favoured
institutions. Some have argued that, especially in teaching and learning, results are
temporary. Others share Dill's (1998) opinion, that the cost/benefit ratio of the whole
exercise is flawed, especially for the lower-ranked institutions where the consumption of
scarce resources on these initiatives has bred staff resentment.
        Nevertheless, the new government elected in August 1996 committed itself to
continuing performance models, albeit with a 5% reduction in operating grants and other
funding restraints (Meek and Wood, 1998). The Higher Education Council was made
responsible for the government's new program, which includes the integration of various
models; institutional reviews of performance improvements every three to four years;
and public reporting of performance improvements. As of 1997, universities had been
asked to submit a copy of their strategic plan, together with information on the key
indicators they used to judge their own performance; current outcomes and intended
improvements; and improvements since the last evaluation (Harman 1998:345).
        A survey by Taylor and colleagues (Taylor et al., 1998) of Australian academics in
three universities sought perceptions of the impacts of these and earlier reforms. The
survey revealed a high level of concern in many areas and a fairly dismal assessment of
future prospects for teaching and research, as well as of the standard of undergraduate
students and the extent of academic freedom. The quality of new students, teaching, and
research are all identified as in decline, while the undervaluing of teaching in
comparison with research persists. Changes in university management to a more
corporate style are seen as a threat to academic freedom. More established research
universities are concerned that scarce research funds are being stretched too widely. This
perception is leading to new divisions in the unified higher education sector. The writers
believe that “the tension between staff desire for academic freedom—with its often
time-consuming collegial decision-making—and management's need for flexibility is set
to continue” (269). Academics' entrenched distrust of administration “will not be
ameliorated by the growing managerial desire to conceive of higher education as a
corporate service industry”. They conclude that “there is a real danger that management
and academic staff will polarize” (ibid.)
        Another study (Marginson, 1998) coined the term "new university" to capture the
institutional impact of the constellation of changes introduced under the reform agenda.
This extensive study of 17 universities found: the emergence of a new kind of strategic
leader in the presidential office; eclipse of collegial decision-making and emergence of
management-controlled, "post-collegial" mechanisms; changes in research management
with consequent effects on academic work; commonalities and variations among the
"new universities"; and that the changes corresponded with systems of "new public
management." These results are confirmed in the study of governance and management
by Meek & Wood (1998).
        Currie and colleagues (Currie, 1998; Currie and Vidovich 1998) conducted a
qualitative study based on interviews of 153 Australian and 100 American academics at
six universities: Sydney, Murdoch, and Edith Cowan in Australia; Arizona, Florida
State, and Louisville in the US. Additional data were drawn from studies and interviews
in Canada and New Zealand. Currie's theoretical framework was constructed around
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Foucault's concept of governmentality; Lyotard's ideas on performativity; and theories of
globalization and pervasive neoliberal market ideals. The focus was managerialism in
Australian and US universities. A large majority (+85%) of respondents in the study
reported increases in accountability and surveillance over the last five years. There was a
sense that performance data were being gathered without any clear perception of how
they were to be used. 
        Other perceptions included: declining budgetary control by faculty; predominance
of private-sector approaches to management; the sense that universities no longer
thought of themselves as primarily educational institutions; and a suspicion that salary
and administrative costs for senior and middle management were burgeoning. Divisions
between faculty and central administration were reported to be widening, with the
academic function becoming subordinated to the administrative function. Full-cost
recovery was a major theme (Fisher and Rubenson, 1998), as were efforts to run the
university like a business. Those areas closer to the market flourished while the rest had
to battle for survival. A majority of faculty (73% in US; 59% in AUS) said
decision-making had become “more bureaucratic, top- down, centralized, autocratic, and
managerial” (Currie, 1998:26). Of the rest, 19% in the US and 17% in AUS identified
democratic decision-making as present at the unit level, while bureaucratic and
corporate managerial procedures predominated at the institutional level.
4. New Zealand 
        New Zealand's 32 post-secondary institutions currently enroll some 200,000
students, just over half at the seven national universities. In September 1997, the New
Zealand government released a green paper on tertiary (higher) education. The proposals
were radical enough to prompt student protests in the streets of Auckland, Christchurch,
and Wellington. Some 74 students were arrested attempting to break through a police
barricade at the Parliament Buildings in Wellington. A student leader said that the
proposals, if enacted, would turn the NZ into the “most right-wing country in the world”
in terms of HE funding (Cohen, 1997:A44). An earlier, leaked version of the document
used the term "corporatization," and painted a picture of “voucher-bearing students
attend[ing] higher education institutions that were more private than public. The
institutions would be expected to turn a profit” (ibid.). The language of the official
version was more temperate.
        Its release was followed by a year of extensive consultation and policy
development—almost 400 submissions were received—culminating in a November
1998 white paper. In substance, the new policies have been compared to the UK's
Dearing Report. Both the UK and NZ documents “suggest a future in which institutions
will bear much more responsibility for their own affairs, particularly their financial
affairs” (Cohen, 1997:A44). The white paper establishes the ground rules for what the
government calls “a high-performing tertiary sector” (Creech, 1998). The policy
direction follows the "evaluative state" model long established in New Zealand. It calls
on universities to “lock-in quality” and sets up a number of mechanisms to ensure
performance will occur.
        A new intermediary body—Quality Assurance Authority New Zealand
(QAANZ)—will “rigorously test” the teaching and research of every institution in the
sector. Funding will depend on performance tests being met. As well, university
governance will be reformed. Governing councils will be limited to twelve members,
including faculty, outside experts, and students. The government reserves the right to
intervene in the affairs of any institution deemed at risk, whether academically or
financially, “to protect the taxpayers' investment”. All institutions will have to
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demonstrate their financial viability before receiving further government funding.
        The awarding of government funds for research will also be modified, along the
lines of Britain's RAE, to introduce competition. Of the $100 million annual research
budget, 20% will be set aside initially as a “contestable pool”. To qualify, researchers
will need a demonstrated track record in their fields and a "strategic" focus that both
benefits the national interest and is cost-effective. In 2001, after a review of the country's
research requirements, the plan is to increase the contestable portion of the annual
budget to 80%.
        These recent moves continue the process of cultural change in the New Zealand
Higher Education System, that began with the "neoliberal experiment" in 1984. In a
program of radical social and economic restructuring, successive governments have
reconfigured the country once called "the welfare capital of the world" (Roberts,
1998:3). As in Australia, and Britain under Thatcher and Major, welfare benefits were
slashed, user-pay systems were introduced in the public sector, and state assets
privatized. The public sphere was transformed by the introduction of quasi-markets
(Marginson, 1997). The trend towards devolution with strong state steering is that of the
"evalulative state." Bureaucrats now talk the language of "inputs," "outputs," and
"throughputs" (Roberts, 1998). Students pay a higher proportion of their educational
costs and are designated as "customers." The teacher-student relationship has become
contractual rather than pedagogic (Codd, 1997). The emphasis on performance and
accountability for results is pervasive. The discourse is of "international
competitiveness" and "enterprise culture" (Roberts, 1998:3). Transforming educational
institutions into corporate entities “geared toward the ideal of making a profit or at least
minimizing losses and efficiencies” has been an important objective (Roberts, 1998:3).
Regular performance reviews—based on a variety of performance indicators—are
mandated for all levels of the institution, to ensure efficiency objectives are met. The
development of a National Qualifications Framework, which breaks down the
"educational product" into "unit standards," facilitates the Taylorization (Dominelli and
Hoogvelt, 1996) and commodification (Peters and Marshall, 1996) of higher education
in New Zealand.
5. Sweden 
        The evaluation movement arrived in Sweden later than elsewhere in Europe, with
performance models first appearing on the political agenda towards the end of the 1980s
(Nilsson and Naslund, 1997). It is also developing somewhat differently than in other
Nordic countries with a clear trend linking program reviews, institutional evaluations,
and national evaluations. Considerable movement can be detected away from the system
of highly centralized state control of HE, that saw the country through the expansive
period of the 1960s and 1970s. Decentralization was the motif of the 1980s. In 1989, the 
Minister of Education appointed a national commission to begin investigating the
quality of higher education. The Liberal-Conservative government of 1991-94 signalled
continuing commitment to deregulation of HE policy, with their 1992 proposition:
Universities and Colleges of Higher Education—Freedom for Quality. They disbanded
the central HE authority (Universitets-och höhskoleämbetet—UHÄ) and allowed
individual insitutions to communicate directly with the Ministry of Education regarding
funding. 
        Infused with neoliberal ideology, the new government sought to provide institutions
with more autonomy in their dealings with the state. They established a national
Secretariat for Evaluation of Universities and Colleges (subsequently to become the
Office of the Chancellor) with a mandate to determine “various indicators of quality
which can be used as the basis for allocating funds for undergraduate education” (SFS,
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1992, cited in Nilsson & Naslund, 1997: 7). When this proved unrealistic at a national
level, each institution was given responsibility for establishing a program of quality
development. With the institution of the 1994 proposition (Teaching and
Research—Quality and Competitiveness) 5% of each institution's resource allocation
was based on an evaluation of its quality development program and iimplementation
efforts (Nilsson and Naslund, 1997). When the Social Democratic government assumed
power in 1994 they did away with this premium, declaring that “quality enhancement is
not simply something that is expressed in special programmes but is basically an attitude
which must characterize the day-to-day work of each institution (Nilsson and Naslund,
1997:7).
        The Social Democratic Government also restructured the intermediate authority
into separate free-standing units— including the National Agency for Higher Education
(Högskoleverket)—to ensure that institutional performance programs were reviewed
regularly. Thus, beginning in 1995, efforts to improve the quality of performance, rather
than the quality of education, became the focus of assessment. Concurrent with this
decision came the announcement that total funding of undergraduate education was
being cut by 10%. Bauer and Kogan (1997) argue that while there appears to be a
general trend in devolution of authority from the state to institutions, and while the
notion of a national system of performance indicators has been abandoned, the State has
actually increased its performance requirements. Feedback of results is an important
function in the new steering system. Greater autonomy has thus been obtained at the
costs of increased demands for accountability, and a more systematic approach to
assurance. This is described by Wahlén (1998), as a shift from a system of management
by rule, to one of management by goals or results. The system includes the evaluation of
individual educational subjects at a National level, the evaluation of education programs
for accreditation, and an emphasis on the development of a professional culture in which
university staff take responsibility for their work and its results. Recently, as well, a new
requirement calls on universities to report student outcomes according to class, ethnicity,
and gender. In performance models generally, social engineering ambitions are never far
away.
        Finally, all 36 institutions of higher education in Sweden must undergo a quality
audit to ensure that mechanisms are in place, before the year 2000, for the efficient use
of resources. From early indications, university reactions to these moves are mostly
positive (Wahlen, 1998:38). 
        In a study of performance systems in the Nordic countries, Smeby & Stensaker
(1999) found evidence in all four countries of balance between internal institutional
needs and external societal needs. None of the countries link assessment with resource
allocation nor are there direct attempts at political steering. Rather, the intent seems to
be ameliorative and, as such, may bolster academics' trust in these systems (1999:13).
Despite surface similarities, however, differences in design and practice are apparent,
reflecting the differing institutional and political endowments of each country. While the
authors accept that performance models represent the new "meta-discourse" of HE
policy, they suggest that “the processes involved imply, at least in the Nordic countries,
very incremental changes to existing structures of power within higher education”
(1999:13). In Norway and Finland, for example, these systems are considered "policy
experiments." In Denmark, the process is undergoing reassessment at the end of the first
round, while in Sweden the history of decentralization and delegation predates the new
meta- discourse, extending back to 1977. The authors conclude that “changes to the
existing external and internal "power balance" between state and institutions…occur
very slowly in all four countries” (ibid.). This study therefore supports a "historical
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institutionalist" interpretation of path-dependent policy change (Hall, 1997).
6. The Netherlands 
        Together with France and Great Britain, the Netherlands was among the first
European countries to institute a formal performance model system in the mid-1980s.
The original approach combined self-evaluation with peer review by visiting expert
committees. The focus was the program, rather than the institution. The state strongly
advocated performance indicators, but these were resisted by universities. The model
was refined in the Ministry of Science and Education's 1985 publication Higher 
Education Autonomy and Quality, which set out a new coordination relationship
between the HE sector and the state (Maassen 1998). More autonomy would be granted,
but in exchange for cooperation in the development of a comprehensive system designed
to regularly assess the performance of university performance. The state would not
completely devolve its authority, but would be selective about the arenas of its
involvement. As well, the coordination relationship was open to other stakeholders such
as employers and local authorities. According to Maassen, the system incorporated a
drift towards market-oriented criteria (1998:20). Universities were to develop strategic,
performance-based self-knowledge—institutional profiles—and were encouraged to
adopt managerial modes of behavior and business principles.
        Originally, the state intended the Inspectorate of Higher Education to administer the
performance model. But through a compromise deal in 1986, the universities and higher
professional schools (the Netherlands has a dual system) were able to involve their own
representative organizations in the process, and the IHO was bypassed. In practice, two
separate systems were developed: one for universities coordinated by the Association of
Cooperating Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU); the other for the higher
professional sector coordinated by the HBO-Council (Maassen, 1998:21-2). Both
emphasized the dual performance goals of quality improvement and accountability. The
VSNU's pilot project began in 1988 and the full system became operational in 1989. 
        While adapted from the North American model, the Dutch system differs because it
is collectively owned by the institutions. Largely because of this, over time, the
emphasis has shifted from the accountability end of the spectrum towards the
improvement end. As well, evaluation results do not feed into the policy or funding
process; there are no political consequences. It is felt direct links would lead to strategic
behaviour and tend to undermine the improvement process (Maassen, 1998:25). This
creates something of a dilemma since real incentives are lacking, yet if incentives were
introduced, power games would prevail. According to Maassen, the Ministry's response
has been to abstain from short-term interventions, but with the threat of medium- to
long-term consequences in the absence of results. Thus the IHO plays a meta-evaluative,
monitoring role. So far, the trust invested in institutions appears not to have been
misplaced. Faculties and departments seem to take their responsibilities under the
system seriously.
        But, in the absence of incentives, what does "taking responsibilities seriously"
mean? Has the low-key approach to performance produced any real change? A study of
Dutch higher education by Frederiks & Westerheijden (1994) concluded that the quality
of teaching is receiving considerably more attention than before the reforms. Many
programs and faculties now have “special committees or specially appointed staff
members for the quality management of education” and the topic “has certainly gained
an important place on the agenda of [university} decision makers” (1994:200). As well,
in contrast to the former singular focus on pedagogy, the input and output characteristics
of education—informing potential students, and investigating the labour market
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prospects for graduates—are now receiving attention. Frederiks & Westerheijden
suggest that a "quality culture" is emerging in Dutch higher education.
        In terms of responses to self-evaluations and the recommendations of visiting
peer-review committees, the authors find that while measures are taken to address
outstanding issues, the relation between taking measures and observing improvement is
obscure. There is no evidence that “the large amount of resources invested leads
immediately to an equally large improvement in the quality of education” (ibid.).
Nevertheless, the authors find a surprisingly high level of satisfaction with the Dutch
performance model. Surprising for two reasons: the traditional reluctance of autonomous
organizations to submit to external scrutiny, and the heavy administrative burden
involved in constructing an adequate self-evaluation.
        Despite generally high levels of satisfaction, however, Maassen forecasts change.
Specifically, this relates to Holland's role in the EU, and the general harmonization of
HE under EU rules. Some type of accreditation approach may well replace the peer
review system in the coming decade.
 
V. Summary and Conclusions
        The politics of performance is deeply embedded in the "evaluative state" and the
trend to performance measurement is unlikely to be reversed. Indeed, with the
normalization of performance expectations and the broadening of knowledge missions
beyond teaching and research, accountability and performance criteria are likely to
become ever more complex and embedded. Gibbons predicts “new bench-marking
methodologies and the production of a range of bench-marking studies right across the
higher education sector” and the use of quality indicators to rank universities “by region,
by country and even globally” (1998: 50). 
        With the globalization of performance in prospect, our study shows deep flaws in
the conceptualization, measurement criteria, and impacts of these models (see Appendix
for more details.) At the technical level, for example, we report lack of clarity in
definitions of what constitutes "good performance," and absence of agreement on the
adequacy of specific indicators. At the broad system level, we identify increasing
differentiation and stratification as universities were defined by their performance
rankings as "good," "bad," or "indifferent" performers, and as either "research" or
"teaching" institutions. Increasingly, teaching and research are being defined as
measurable products rather than processes of learning or enquiry. The proliferation of
buffer bodies to mediate compliance with performance models was a feature of all
systems studied.
        In terms of institutional effects, we find a performance- linked focus on missions
and visions that promote increased efficiency and calls for more effective, centralized
management. Funding is increasingly linked to performance on various measures,
variously defined, few of which account for traditional moral or social imperatives. A
consistent complaint is the amount of time and expense involved in conforming to
proliferating compliance requirements. Individual departments and faculty members
report erosion of disciplinary boundaries and decline of collegiality, as well as
polarization between departments and the locus of administrative control. Throughout,
we find a strong consensus that the costs of compliance with performance regimes far
outweigh the benefits. 
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        Our review of the experience of different states and institutions raises a number of
empirical questions deserving of further study. Is there any evidence that
performance-based funding will actually improve institutional performance in the long
run? Is the money allocated in these programs a large enough incentive for participation,
or is the implied threat of greater state intervention and the loss of autonomy sufficient
motivation? Does compliance indicate agreement with the concept and process? Are the
ways states deal with non-compliance effective? Do attempts to meet general,
institution-level performance measures create goal dissonance and other difficulties at
different internal levels? To what extent is the increased demand for detailed reporting
an additional burden? Will institutions engage in aggressive competition in attempts to
demonstrate compliance? If funding is at stake, is there a possibility that quality of
education will be sacrificed in the rush to meet external standards and access additional
funds? 
        Only longitudinal empirical research can answer questions like these, and
determine whether performance models have enduring value for the conduct of higher
education. Further study is clearly needed. Given the evidence to date, there seems to be
no "ideal" model or mix. However, if one country stands out, it is the Netherlands. Of
those national systems reviewed here, the Dutch seem to have mastered the positive
aspects of performance models while avoiding many of the more negative consequences.
This is the reason, no doubt, that many countries in Continental Europe follow a "softer"
Dutch-style model, involving qualitative measures and far less prominence for
performance indicators than in the UK and US. States, territories, and provinces that
have yet to implement these models, might want to consider the contrasting
understandings of "performance" in the European and Anglo-Saxon systems, and review
relative strengths and weaknesses, before committing resources.
        In conclusion, few would argue against the ethic of accountability that animates
performance models, nor would they disagree that what performance models measure is
important. But the "fatal flaw" of performance models is that they reduce performance to
what is measurable, when so much of importance is not. Because performance models
focus on instrumental and utilitarian concerns, the fear is that the intrinsic value of
education may be lost.
        As it becomes more accountable in a "knowledge society," can the university
survive in its traditional form? Survival may depend on a much broader definition of
accountability, according to Delanty (1999); one that encompasses public and civic
commitment. The best way to guarantee the future of the university, he says, is to
reposition it at the heart of the public sphere, “establish[ing] strong links with the public
culture, providing the public with enlightenment about the mechanisms of power and
seeking alternative forms of social organization.” Further, with university knowledge
becoming such a central social, economic and political resource, why be “a tool of the
state and market forces”? Why not, instead, become an agent of social and political
change? (ibid.). The central task, we would argue, is to embrace a social mission, banish
lingering élitism, and advance the democratization of knowledge.
Appendix: Summary of issues and impacts of 
performance models internationally
        In the tables below, we itemize the consequences, impacts, and issues attached to
the performance models we reviewed in a set of tables. As this article makes clear, some
of these effects are more pronounced in Anglo-Saxon systems, others in European
systems. We do not differentiate among the systems nor do we make a determination
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whether the consequences are good, bad, or indifferent, since these are open to
interpretation and will be conditioned by the reader. We have organized the effects into
five categories: (i) overall system-level effects; (ii) technical performance issues; (iii)
institutional effects and management issues; (iv) impacts on teaching and research; and
(v) impacts on faculty and academic departments. Clearly, many of the effects
"spill-over" into other categories and may even appear mutually contradictory. It is
worth reiterating that, whatever the commonalities, legacies count. Whether cultural,
institutional, national, or ideological, the differences between systems are as great as the
convergence among them. Finally, the classification scheme is both provisional and
heuristic and should not be read otherwise. No attempt is made to rank-order the effects
or to exhaustively reproduce every element previously discussed. We try, instead, to
convey generalities.
System-level effects
possible differentiation of universities into research institutions and teaching
institutions        
increased stratification, as rankings differentiate "good," "bad," and "indifferent"
performers
more isomorphism as valid differences are erased by conformance to a limited
number of indicators
"newcomers" have to compete with established institutions for limited funds
established institutions have to share "steady state" funding with newcomers
proliferation of external intermediary bodies to administer performance and
quality programs and mandate consequences of noncompliance and "poor
performance"
more "rational" basis for funding decisions therefore better justifications for HE
funding
bilateral systems unified
social engineering ambitions
broad frameworks replace regulation (dejuridifation)
proliferation of stakeholders to be accommodated
Technical performance issues
lack of agreed-on definitions of what constitutes "good performance" (quality)
lack of agreement concerning the adequacy of specific performance indicators
incompatibilities between performance measures, so that maximizing some means
underperforming on others
inability of quantitative measures to capture contextual and institutional
differences
use of dubious proxies of performance
reduction of complexity
subjective bias in construction and interpretation of measures
appearance of "objective" neutrality
more, and more directly useful data; revelations about previously unknown
aspects of performance
increased ability to "prove" accountability for public funds
susceptibility of measures to changing political agendas
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Institutional effects and management issues
increased efficiency and more effective management
focus on "missions," priorities, and identification of strengths
growth of non-academic management-support functions with the power to
intervene in academic decisions
funding increasingly linked to performance, on various measures, variously
defined
increased competition, both within and between institutions
increased surveillance, both internal and external
centralized, corporate decision making, supported by budgetary and
performance-based criteria
increased time and costs to administer and conform to proliferating compliance
requirements
possibility that short term gains from compliance will produce "long-term pain"
possibility that the "short term pain" of compliance will produce long term gains
evidence that universities are becoming more market-like; strategic behaviour to
maximize market gains
evidence that universities are abandoning traditional societal and moral
imperatives
better understandings of institutional missions and new, more dynamic
perspectives on the management of institutions
better responsiveness to the needs of public, political, and other stakeholders
limited financial incentives
Impacts on teaching and research
performance defined as measurable product (publications; external research
funding; job-ready graduates) rather than process (learning; inquiry)
separation of research and teaching
more-rigorous definitions of "active research"
focus on quantity rather than quality of research
focus on quantity rather than quality of publications
devaluation of teaching in some systems, with shift of resources to research
less time for performing teaching and research due to conforming with compliance
procedures
peer-reviewer "burn-out" as more are called on to participate in assessments and
audits
preference for research with measurable outcomes, within a defined time frame,
that carries external funding
shift in pedagogical emphasis as students demand more "relevance"
value-for-money approach: students are no longer learners in pursuit of
understanding, but customers taking delivery of a commodity
impact of cost/benefit and cost-recovery constraints on course diversity
narrow definitions of research performance discourage risk-taking and innovation
Impacts on faculty and academic departments
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erosion of disciplinary boundaries
decline of collegiality
individual projects discouraged in favour of "team efforts"
polarization between faculties/departments and central administration
detrimental effect of compliance exercises on faculty workloads
decreased faculty time for students and community service
increased stress, anxiety, uncertainty, and resentment
resistance to the measures although this tends to be passive rather than active
"Taylorization" of faculty work means more short-term contracts and less security
loss of autonomy over individual work
demands for more productivity
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